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Abstract
We present a Bayesian framework for learning probabilis-
tic specifications from large, unstructured code corpora, and
a method to use this framework to statically detect anoma-
lous, hence likely buggy, program behavior. The distinctive
insight here is to build a statistical model that correlates all
specifications hidden inside a corpus with the syntax and
observed behavior of programs that implement these spec-
ifications. During the analysis of a particular program, this
model is conditioned into a posterior distribution that pri-
oritizes specifications that are relevant to this program. This
allows accurate program analysis even if the corpus is highly
heterogeneous. The problem of finding anomalies is now
framed quantitatively, as a problem of computing a distance
between a “reference distribution” over program behaviors
that our model expects from the program, and the distribu-
tion over behaviors that the program actually produces.
We present a concrete embodiment of our framework that
combines a topic model and a neural network model to learn
specifications, and queries the learned models to compute
anomaly scores. We evaluate this implementation on the
task of detecting anomalous usage of Android APIs. Our
encouraging experimental results show that the method can
automatically discover subtle errors in Android applications
in the wild, and has high precision and recall compared to
competing probabilistic approaches.
1. Introduction
Over the years, research on automated bug finding in pro-
grams has had many real-world successes (Bessey et al.
2010; Ball et al. 2011). However, one perennial source of
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difficulty here is the need for formal specifications. Tradi-
tional approaches in this area require the user to specify cor-
rectness properties; any property that is not specified is out-
side the scope of reasoning. However, formally specifying
real-world software is a difficult task that users often refuse
to undertake.
A natural response to this difficulty is to automatically
learn specifications of popular software components like
APIs and frameworks. The availability of large corpora of
open-source code — Big Code (Raychev et al. 2015), in the
language of some recent efforts — makes this idea especially
appealing. By analyzing these corpora, one can generate
numerous examples of how real-world programs use a set
of components. Statistical methods can then be used to learn
common patterns in these examples. According to the well-
known thesis that bugs are anomalous behaviors (Engler
et al. 2001; Hangal & Lam 2002), a program whose use of
the components significantly deviates from these “typical”
usage patterns can be flagged as erroneous.
The problem of specification learning has been studied
for a long time (Ammons et al. 2002, 2003; Alur et al. 2005;
Goues & Weimer 2009). However, existing approaches to
the problem face two basic issues when applied to large code
corpora. First, examples derived from such a corpus can be
noisy. While programs in a mature corpus are likely to be
correct on the average, not all examples extracted from such
a corpus represent correct behavior. Second, such a corpus is
fundamentally heterogeneous, and may contain many differ-
ent specifications, some of them mutually contradictory. For
example, it may be legitimate to use a set of APIs in many
different ways depending on the context, and a large enough
corpus would contain instances of all these usage patterns. A
specification learning tool should distinguish between these
patterns, and a bug-finding tool should only compare a pro-
gram with the patterns that are relevant to it.
Among existing methods for specification learning, the
majority follow a traditional, qualitative view of program
correctness. In this view, a specification is a set of program
behaviors (e.g., sequences of calls to API methods), and a
behavior is either correct (in the specification) or incorrect
(outside the specification). Such an approach is not robust
to noise because its belief in the correctness of a behavior
does not change smoothly with the behavior’s observed fre-
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quency. A small number of incorrect examples can persuade
the method that the behavior is fully correct.
An obvious fix to this problem is to view a specifica-
tion as a probabilistic rather than a boolean model. Such
a specification assigns quantitative likelihood values to ob-
served program behaviors, with higher likelihood represent-
ing greater confidence in a behavior’s correctness. Some re-
cent work adopts this view by modeling program behaviors
using models like n-grams (Nguyen & Nguyen 2015; Wang
et al. 2016a) and recurrent neural networks (Raychev et al.
2014). To find bugs using such a model, one generates be-
haviors of the target program using static or dynamic anal-
ysis, then evaluates the likelihood of these behaviors (Wang
et al. 2016b).
While robust to noise, approaches of this sort have a basic
difficulty with heterogeneity. The root of this difficulty is
that these methods learn a single probability distribution
over program behaviors. For example, if Ψ1 and Ψ2 are
two common but distinct patterns in which programs in a
corpus use a set of APIs, these approaches would learn a
specification that is a mixture of Ψ1 and Ψ2. During program
analysis, such a mixture would assign low or meaningless
likelihoods to behaviors that match one of, but not both, Ψ1
and Ψ2. As behaviors from a given program are likely to
follow only one of the two patterns, this phenomenon would
lead to inaccurate analysis.
In this paper, we present a Bayesian approach to specifi-
cation learning and bug finding that is robust to heterogene-
ity and noise. Our key insight is to build a “big” statistical
model that captures the entire gamut of specifications in an
unstructured code corpus. More precisely, our model learns
a joint probability distribution that relates hidden specifica-
tions Ψ with syntactic features X that describe what imple-
mentations of these specifications “look like”. When using
this model to analyze a particular program F , we specialize
it into a posterior distribution P (Ψ|XF ) over specifications,
conditioned on the features XF of F . Intuitively, this distri-
bution assigns higher weight to specifications for programs
that “look like” F , and can be seen as the part of the model
that is relevant to F .
This model architecture can tolerate high (in principle,
unbounded) amounts of heterogeneity in the corpus. Sup-
pose that the programs in the corpus use a set of APIs follow-
ing distinct patterns Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn, but that programs that look
like F (i.e., have feature set XF ) tend to follow Ψ1. During
training, our framework learns this correlation between XF
and Ψ1. This means that the posterior distribution P (Ψ|XF )
puts a high weight on Ψ1 and low weights on Ψ2, . . . ,Ψn,
and that effectively, correctness analysis of F happens with
respect to Ψ1 rather than any other specification.
Our second key idea is to frame the detection of likely
errors as an operation over probability distributions. We as-
sume, for each program F , a distribution PF (θ) over the
behaviors of the program. This distribution — a proba-
bilistic behavior model — may be learned from data, or,
as is the case in this paper, be a definition that is a param-
eter of the framework. This allows us to develop a model
P (θ|Ψ) of the behaviors θ of a program that follows a spec-
ification Ψ. When combined with the posterior distribution
P (Ψ|XF ) for Ψ, this model gives us a “reference distri-
bution” P (θ|XF ) over behaviors that the model expects
from a program that looks like F . The anomaly score of
F , which quantifies the extent to which F behaves abnor-
mally, is now defined as a statistical distance (in particular,
the Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback & Leibler 1951))
between P (θ|XF ) and PF (θ).
Our Bayesian approach is a framework, meaning that it
can be implemented using a wide range of concrete statis-
tical models. The particular instantiation we present in this
paper is a combination of the popular topic model known as
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al. 2003), and
a class of neural networks that are conditioned on a topic
model (Mikolov & Zweig 2012). To compute the anomaly
score for a program F , we repeatedly query this model for
the likelihood of different behaviors of F , and then aggre-
gate these likelihood values into an estimate of the anomaly
score.
We evaluate our implementation in the task of finding
erroneous API usage in Android applications. Using three
APIs as benchmarks, we show that the tool can automati-
cally discover subtle API bugs in Android applications in
the wild. These violations range from GUI bugs to inade-
quate encryption strength. Some of these errors are difficult
to characterize in logic-based specification notations, indi-
cating the promise of our approach in settings where tradi-
tional formal methods are hard to apply. We also demon-
strate that the method has good precision recall and is more
robust to heterogeneity than a comparable non-Bayesian ap-
proach.
Now we summarize the contributions of this paper:
• We present a novel Bayesian framework for learning spec-
ifications from large code corpora. (Section 3)
• We offer a novel formulation of the problem of finding
anomalous program behavior as the problem of computing
a distance between a program and a reference distribution.
(Section 3)
• We present an instantiation our framework with a topic
model and a topic-conditioned recurrent neural network.
(Section 4)
• We evaluate the approach on the problem of detecting
anomalous API usage in a suite of Android applications
(Section 5)
2. Overview
In this section, we present an overview of our approach, with
the help of an illustrative example.
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2.1 Modeling Framework and Workflow
Our approach has the following key aspects. First, we as-
sume the existence of a specification Ψ for each program F .
However, unlike traditional approaches that start with a for-
mal specification, Ψ in our context is not observable. Instead,
what is observable is XF , a set of syntactic features for F .
The features are evidence, or data, that inform our opinion
as to the unseen specification Ψ. In Bayesian fashion, our
uncertainty about Ψ is formalized as a posterior distribution
P (Ψ|XF ), which measures the extent to which we believe
that Ψ is the correct specification for F , given the evidence.
Second, our framework allows for uncertainty regarding
the behaviors θ — defined as sequences of observable ac-
tions — that a given program F produces. This uncertainty
comes from the fact that we do not exactly know the inputs
on which the program will run, and is captured by a prob-
ability distribution PF (θ). The framework also allows for a
distribution P (θ|Ψ) over the behaviors of programs that im-
plement a given specification Ψ. This uncertainty can come
from the fact that we do not know the inputs to implementa-
tions of Ψ, or the fact that we may have never seen a spec-
ification exactly like Ψ before, so that we have to guess the
behavior of a program implementing Ψ.
Our a priori belief about the relationships between speci-
fications and the features and behaviors of their implementa-
tions is given by a joint distribution P (θ,XF ,Ψ). Our third
key idea is that this distribution is informed by data extracted
from a corpus of code. This information is taken into account
formally during a learning phase that fits the joint distribu-
tion prior model to the data.
Finally, in the inference phase, we frame bug detection as
a problem of computing a quantitative anomaly score. In tra-
ditional correctness analysis, the semantics of programs and
specifications are given by sets, and one checks if the set
difference between a program and a specification is empty.
Our formulation is a quantitative generalization of this, and
defines the anomaly score for a program F as the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence (Kullback & Leibler 1951) between
the behavior distribution PF (θ) for F , and the posterior dis-
tribution P (θ|XF ) that the model expects from F . Correct-
ness analysis amounts to checking whether this score is be-
low a threshold.
The workflow of our method is as in Figure 1. The train-
ing and inference phases are denoted by green (solid) edges
and red (dashed) edges respectively. During training, from
each program Fi in a large corpus of programs F1, F2, . . . ,
we extract a set of syntactic features XFi , and sample a
set of behaviors from the distribution PFi(θ), forming the
training data. From this data, we learn the joint distribution
P (θ,X,Ψ; M), where M are the model parameters.
During inference, we extract the features XF of a given
program F , and query the trained model for the distribution
P (θ|XF ; M) that tells us how F should behave. Separately,
we obtain the distribution PF (θ) over observed behaviors of
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Figure 1. Workflow, with instantiations in grey boxes
F . The anomaly score of F is then computed as the KL-
divergence between these distributions.
2.2 Instantiating the Framework
An instantiation of our framework must concretely define
program features and behaviors, and the way in which the
distributions P (θ,X,Ψ; M) and PF (θ) are obtained. In this
paper, we consider a particular instantiation where the goal
is to learn patterns in the way programs call methods in a set
of APIs. We abstract each such call as a symbol from a finite
set, and define a behavior θ as a sequence of symbols. The
feature XF for a program F is the set of symbols that F can
generate.
A key idea in the instantiation is to capture hidden specifi-
cations using a topic model. Here, “topic” is an abstraction of
the hidden semantic structure of a program. A specification
for a program F is a vector of probabilities whose the i-th
component is the probability that F follows the i-th topic.
For example, the topics in a given corpus may correspond to
GUI programs and bit-manipulating programs. A program
that makes many calls to GUI APIs will likely have a higher
probability for the former topic.
Specifically, we use the well-known Latent Dirichlet Al-
location (LDA) (Blei et al. 2003) topic model to learn a
joint distribution P (Ψ, X; M) over the topics and features
of programs. A topic-conditioned recurrent neural network
model (Mikolov & Zweig 2012), is used to as the second
model P (θ|Ψ; M). The joint distribution P (θ,X,Ψ; M) that
our framework maintains can be factored into these two dis-
tributions.
Our probabilistic model PF (θ) for behaviors of programs
F is not data-driven. This is because to learn this distribu-
tion statistically, we would need data on the inputs that F
receives in the real world. Since such data is not available
in typical code corpora, we simply assume a definition of
PF (θ). While many such definitions are possible, the one
we pick models F as a class of automata, called generative
probabilistic automata (Ammons et al. 2002; Murawski &
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1 AlertDialog.Builder b = new AlertDialog.Builder(this);
2 b.setTitle(R.string.title_variable_to_insert);
3 if (focus.getId() == R.id.tmpl_item)
4 b.setItems(R.array.templatebodyvars, this);
5 else if (focus.getId() == R.id.tmpl_footer)
6 b.setItems(R.array.templateheaderfootervars, this);
7 b.show();
(b)(i)
1 AlertDialog.Builder b = new AlertDialog.Builder(this);
2 b.setMessage("Parametres?");
3 b.setCancelable(false);
4 b.setView(dlgLayout);
5 b.setPositiveButton("Ok", new OnClickListener(){. . .});
6 b.setTitle("Aide")
7 b.show();
(a)(i) (a)(ii) (b)(ii)
Figure 2. (a) Abnormal dialog boxes discovered by our anomaly detection (b) Code snippets corresponding to the dialog boxes
Ouaknine 2005). The distribution PF (θ) is simply the se-
mantics of this automaton.
2.3 Example
Consider the problem of finding bugs in GUIs, where the
right and wrong ways of invoking GUI API methods are
seldom formally defined. Specifically, consider a dialog box
in a GUI that does not give the user an option to close
the box, and a dialog box that does not display any textual
content. Clearly, such boxes violate user expectations, and
are buggy in that sense. Two such boxes, produced by real-
world Android apps, are shown in Figure 2(a).
The code snippets responsible for these boxes are shown
in Figure 2. For example, in Figure 2(b)(i), b is a dialog box;
the method b.setItems(...) adds content to the dialog box;
the method b.show() displays the box. If the branches in
lines 4 and 7 are not taken, then b.show() opens the box
without a “close” button. Note that the sequences of API
calls that lead to these bugs are not forbidden by the API,
and would not be caught by a traditional program analysis. In
contrast, a statistical method like ours can observe thousands
of programs and learn that these sequences are abnormal.
Operationally, to debug this program, we generated fea-
tures and behaviors from a corpus of Android apps. Using
these features, LDA learned to classify programs by the APIs
they use, and to also distinguish between different usage pat-
terns in the same API. Consider the examples of dialog box
creation in Figure 2(b), where program F1 in (b)(i) explic-
itly specifies the items that go into the box, and the pro-
gram F2 in (b)(ii) provides a View that encompasses the
items that go into the box. LDA can assign different top-
ics to these usage patterns. For example, the pattern used in
F1 could be assigned the first topic, resulting in a topic vec-
tor (Ψ) 〈0.98, 0.01, 0.01〉, and the pattern used in F2 could
be assigned the second topic, resulting in the topic vector
〈0.01, 0.98, 0.01〉.
Conditioned on such a topic vector Ψ, a topic-conditioned
RNN provides the probability of an API call sequence θ, that
is, P (θ|Ψ). For instance, given the former topic vector, a
topic-conditioned RNN trained on thousands of examples of
topics and behaviors would provide a high probability to a
sequence such as:
new A() setTitle(...) setItems(...) show()
(where new A() is a call to the constructor) and a low proba-
bility to an abnormal sequence such as
new A() setTitle(...) show()
as it shows a dialog without any content. However, our prob-
abilistic automaton model PF1(θ) of F1 would assign about
0.66 and 0.33 probability, respectively, to these sequences.
In general, the KL-divergence between the two distributions
will be high, causing F1 to be flagged as anomalous.
3. Bayesian Specification Framework
In this section, we formalize our framework, along with the
problems of specification learning and anomaly detection.
3.1 Program Behaviors and Features
Our framework is parameterized by a programming lan-
guage. Each program in the language has a syntax and an
operational semantics. Because the details of the language
do not matter to the framework, we do not concretely de-
fine this syntax and semantics. Instead, we assume that the
syntax of each program F can be abstracted into a feature
set XF . For instance, such features can include syntactic
constructs, assertions, and natural language comments. We
also assume that program actions during execution can be
abstracted into a finite alphabet Σ of observable symbols
(including an empty symbol ). We model program execu-
tions as behaviors θ, defined to be words in Σ∗. A behavior
is the result of a probabilistic generative process that takes
place when a program is executed. Accordingly, we assume
a probabilistic behavior model of F , defined as a distribution
PF (θ) over the behaviors of F .
3.2 Specification Learning
Our Bayesian statistical framework builds a generative
model of the form P (θ,X,Ψ) = P (θ|Ψ)P (X|Ψ)P (Ψ).
This model captures the intuition that every program is im-
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plementing some unknown specification in the space of all
specifications (P (Ψ)), which determines the program’s be-
havior (P (θ|Ψ)) and features (P (X|Ψ)).
Building this model requires data, in the form of a large
corpus of example programs. As in all statistical learning
methods, we first develop an appropriate statistical model,
which is typically a distribution family, and then learn
that model—choose the parameters for the model family
so they match reality—by training it on data. To this end,
P (θ,X,Ψ) also takes as input a set of model parameters M.
Fully parameterized, this distribution becomes:
P (θ,X,Ψ; M) = P (θ|Ψ; M)P (X|Ψ; M)P (Ψ; M) (1)
The available data are then used to choose an appropriate
set of parameters M, using an optimization method such
as maximum likelihood. Suppose that we are given a large
corpus of programs {F1, . . . , FN}, and for each program Fi
we have extracted the pair (XFi , 〈θi,1 θi,2, . . .〉) consisting
of its feature set and a number of examples of its behavior
sampled from its behavior model. Given this data, we would
choose M that maximizes the function:
N∏
i=1
∫
Ψ
∏
θi,j
P (θi,j |Ψ; M)
P (XFi |Ψ; M)P (Ψ; M) dΨ

Note that we integrate out Ψ, since this is an unseen random
variable, as we typically do not know the value of the precise
specification associated with each code in the corpus. Once
M is learned, the distribution would represent our prior be-
lief as to what the “typical” specification, behavior and fea-
tures look like, informed by the programs in the corpus.
3.3 Anomaly Detection
Suppose that we are given a new program F and would
like to obtain a quantitative measure of the “bugginess”
of F . On the one hand, since we already have learned a
joint distribution over behaviors, features and specifications,
P (θ,X,Ψ; M), we can condition this distribution with the
newly observed XF , to obtain the posterior:
P (θ,Ψ|XF ; M) = P (θ,Ψ, XF ; M)
P (XF ; M)
From Equation 1, we have
P (θ,Ψ|XF ; M) = P (θ|Ψ; M)P (XF |Ψ; M)P (Ψ; M)
P (XF ; M)
Applying Bayes’ rule to the term P (XF |Ψ; M) we get
P (θ,Ψ|XF ; M)
=
P (θ|Ψ; M)P (Ψ|XF ; M)P (XF ; M)
P (Ψ; M)
P (Ψ; M)
P (XF ; M)
= P (θ|Ψ; M)P (Ψ|XF ; M)
From this, since we do not know the precise specification
that F is implementing, we can integrate out Ψ to obtain the
(marginalized) posterior distribution over behaviors:
P (θ|XF ; M) =
∫
Ψ
P (θ|Ψ; M)P (Ψ|XF ; M) dΨ (2)
This particular form is very amenable to Monte Carlo inte-
gration, which estimates an integral through random sam-
pling. Intuitively, it gives us a distribution over the program
behaviors θ, that would be anticipated, given learned model
parameters M, for a program with feature set XF .
On the other hand, we have a distribution PF (θ) over
the actual behaviors of F when it is executed. The final
step is to then compare this actual distribution with the
anticipated distribution over behaviors, that is, PF (θ) and
P (θ|XF ; M). A measure such as the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence (Kullback & Leibler 1951) between distributions
is appropriate here. The KL-divergence between two distri-
butions P1 and P2 over the domain i is a quantitative mea-
sure defined as:
DKL(P‖Q) =
∑
i
P1(i) log
P1(i)
P2(i)
(3)
Using this measure, we can compute the anomaly score
of F by setting P1 and P2 to the distributions PF (θ) and
P (θ|XF ; M) respectively, and ranging i over the domain of
all possible program behaviors in the language Σ∗:∑
θ∈Σ∗
PF (θ) log
PF (θ)
P (θ|XF ; M) (4)
Choosing an Abstraction When instantiating the frame-
work, the exact form of the feature set XF must be cho-
sen with some care. If the feature set XF does not provide
any abstraction for the program (in the extreme case, XF
is merely the program itself) and the model and learner are
arbitrarily powerful, then P (θ|XF ; M) (Equation 2) could,
in theory, describe the compiler and symbolic executor used
to produce the training data. This would mean that the KL
divergence (Equation 3) is zero for any program.
When applying the framework to a problem, we protect
against this possibility by choosing a feature set XF that ab-
stracts the program to an appropriate level for the debug-
ging task. For example, when debugging API usage, it makes
sense to choose XF as the bag of API calls made by the
code. This ensures that P (θ|XF ; M) is limited to attaching
probabilities to various sequences that can be made out of
those calls, and it is impossible for the learner to “learn” to
compile and execute a program.
4. Instantiation of the Framework
In this section, we present an instantiation of our framework,
and discuss practical implementation challenges.
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4.1 Probabilistic Behavior Model PF (θ)
First, our instantiation includes a definition of the prob-
abilistic behavior model PF (θ). This definition relies on
the abstraction of programs as generative probabilistic au-
tomata (Murawski & Ouaknine 2005; Sokolova & de Vink
2004).
Program Model. A generative probabilistic automaton is a
tuple F = 〈Q,Σ, q0, QA, δ〉 whereQ is a finite set of states,
Σ is the alphabet of observable symbols that was introduced
earlier, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, QA ⊆ Q is a set of
final or accepting states, and δ : Q × Σ × R(0,1] × Q is
a transition relation. We have δ(qi, s, p, qj) if the automaton
can transition between states qi and qj with a probability
p ∈ (0, 1], generating the symbol s. (We write qi s,p−−→ qj
if such a transition exists.) Transitions with probability 0, or
infeasible transitions, are excluded from the automaton.
A program in a high-level language is transformed into
the above representation through symbolic execution (King
1976), during a preprocessing phase. Symbolic execution
runs a program with symbolic inputs and keeps track of
symbolic states, which are analogous to a program’s mem-
ory. The symbolic states encountered become the states Q,
and the accepting states QA are typically the states at a fi-
nal location (or some location of interest) in the program.
Unbounded loops can be handled by imposing a bound on
symbolic loop unrolls, or through a predicate abstraction of
the program to make variable domains finite. The detection
of infeasible states—in general an undecidable problem—
depends on the underlying theorem prover used by symbolic
execution.
As symbolic execution is a standard method in formal
methods (Jaffar et al. 2012; Cadar et al. 2008; Anand et al.
2007), this section only gives an example of the method’s
use. As it is applied at a preprocessing level, we often use
the term “program” to refer to an automaton generated via
symbolic execution, rather than a higher-level program to
which preprocessing is applied.
Semantics. A run pi of F is defined as a finite sequence of
transitions q0
s1,p1−−−→ q1 s2,p2−−−→ · · · sn,pn−−−→ qn beginning
at the initial state q0. pi is accepting if qn ∈ QA. The
probability of a run P (pi) =
∏n
i=1 pi. Every run pi generates
a behavior θ ∈ Σ∗, denoted as [|pi|] = s1s2 · · · sn. Let ΠF
be the set of all accepting runs of F , and ΠF (θ) ⊆ ΠF
be the set of all accepting runs pi such that [|pi|] = θ. The
probabilistic behavior model PF (θ) : Σ∗ → [0, 1] is:
PF (θ) =
1
Z
∑
pi∈ΠF (θ)
P (pi). (5)
Here, Z =
∑
pi∈ΠF P (pi) is a normalization factor.
It is easy to see that PF (θ) defines a probability distribu-
tion over behaviors. To generate a “random” behavior of F ,
we simply sample from the distribution PF (θ).
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Figure 3. Automaton for the example in Figure 2(b)(i)
Features. Given a program F , the feature set XF is de-
fined as {s | qi s,p−−→ qj ∈ δ} \ {}, i.e., the set of all
non-empty symbols in the transition system of F .
Example. The automaton model for the code in Fig-
ure 2(b)(i) is shown in Figure 3. Each “state” in the au-
tomaton is labeled with a program location, with multiple
instances of the same location being primed. The initial state
is the first location, and the accepting states, in bold, are all
instances of a (special) terminal location T in the program.
The transitions follow the structure of the code (for brevity,
we collapse sequential statements into a single transition),
emitting as symbols API methods called at each location.
Note that we gave a uniform probability at each state to
transition to the next possible states, but this can be con-
trolled through other means. For instance, one can apply
model counting on a branch condition and compute the prob-
ability of the program executing one branch over another.
Such a definition is not necessarily a better choice than ours,
as it would assign low probabilities to corner cases that get
triggered on a small number of inputs but are often of in-
terest to users of static analysis. The two definitions simply
make different tradeoffs. We go with a uniform distribution
at branches because it is simpler and worked well in our ex-
periments.
{new A(), setTitle(. . .), setItems(. . .), show()} is
the feature set for this program. There are three accepting
runs of F , and two behaviors generated by these accepting
runs:
θ1 = new A() setTitle(. . .) setItems(. . .) show()
θ2 = new A() setTitle(. . .) show()
We have Z = 1.0, the sum of the probabilities of all accept-
ing runs. Hence, PF (θ1) = (0.33 + 0.33)/1.0 = 0.66 and
PF (θ2) = 0.33.
Assume now that after training on a large number of be-
haviors, the statistical model had learned that conditioned
on specifications such as 〈0.98, 0.01, 0.01〉 (that gave a high
probability to the first topic), program behaviors tend to al-
ways add a title and items to dialog boxes before being
shown. This might result in the behavior θ1 having a very
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high probability, say 0.99, and all other behaviors having
a very low probability. Particularly, a behavior that only
calls setTitle without setItems would be assigned a very
low probability, say, 10−5. In our program F , we saw that
PF (θ1) = 0.66 and PF (θ2) = 0.33, and the probabil-
ity of any other θ is 0. Thus, the anomaly score of F is:
0.66 log 0.660.99 + 0.33 log
0.33
10−5 = 3.16 Suppose now, that the
state 11′ in the program model was infeasible. Then, both
accepting runs in the model would only generate θ1, and so
PF (θ1) = 1. The anomaly score of this “correct” program
would then be log 10.99 = 0.01.
4.2 Topic Models for P (Ψ, X; M)
Topic models are used in natural language processing to au-
tomatically extract topics from a large number of “docu-
ments” containing textual data as words. In our case, doc-
uments are the feature sets X , words are symbols from the
alphabet (vocabulary) Σ, and the topic distribution of a doc-
ument is its unknown specification Ψ.
LDA (Blei et al. 2003) is a popular topic model that
models the generative process of documents in a corpus
where each document XFi contains a bag of words. The
inputs to LDA are the number of topics to be extracted K,
and two hyper-parameters α and η. LDA models a document
as a distribution over topics, and a topic as a distribution over
words in the vocabulary. An LDA model is characterized by
the variables: (i) α and η, hyper-parameters of a Dirichlet
prior that chooses the topic distribution of each document
and the word distribution of each topic, respectively (ii) ΨFi ,
the topic distribution of document XFi , (iii) βk, the word
distribution of topic k.
The result of training an LDA model is a learned value
for all the latent variables α, η, ΨFi and βk, which forms
our model parameter M. During inference, we are given a
document XF , and we would like to compute the posterior
distribution P (Ψ|XF ; M). Since LDA has already learned
a joint distribution P (Ψ, X; M), this is simply a matter of
conditioning this distribution with the newly observed XF
to get a posterior distribution over Ψ, which is often approx-
imated through a technique called Gibbs sampling (Geman
& Geman 1984).
4.3 Recurrent Neural Networks for P (θ|Ψ; M)
Neural networks have been used to solve classification prob-
lems such as image recognition and part-of-speech tag-
ging. These problems involve classifying an input x into
a set of (output) classes y, using the conditional distribution
P (y|x,M) where M is the set of neural network parameters.
Suppose that x is a given sequence of symbols (charac-
ters) s1s2 . . . st−1 where each symbol is from the alphabet
Σ, and we would like the model to generate the next symbol
st. We can cast this generative problem as a classification
task by creating x1x2 . . . xt−1 where each xk is the one-hot
vector of sk and querying the model to “classify” the se-
quence x1x2 . . . xt−1 into |Σ| classes. The output vector yt is
then interpreted as a distribution over Σ, from which a sym-
bol st can be sampled (Bengio et al. 2003). Let us denote
the probability of a symbol s given by the output distribution
yt as yt(s).
A topic-conditioned neural network (Mikolov & Zweig
2012) takes, in addition to x, an input Ψ representing the
topic distribution of a document obtained from a topic
model. To handle unbounded length input sequences, a re-
current neural network is used. An RNN uses a hidden state
to neurally encode the sequence it has seen so far. At time
point t, the hidden state ht and the output yt are computed
as:
ht = f(Wht−1 +VΨ+Uxt+bh), yt = g(Tht+by) (6)
where W, V, U and T are the weight matrices of the RNN,
bh and by are the bias vectors of the hidden states and
outputs respectively, f is a non-linear activation function
such as the sigmoid, and g is a softmax function that ensures
that the output is a distribution.
Training the model involves defining an error function
between the output of the RNN and the observed output in
the training data. Specifically, if the training data is of the
form (XFi , 〈θi,1, θi,2, . . .〉), then each training step of the
RNN will consist of the input x being θi,j , target output y
being θi,j shifted by one position to the left (since at time
point t the output yt is interpreted as the distribution over
the next symbol in the sequence), and Ψ being a sample from
P (Ψ|XF ; M) given by the trained topic model. A standard
error function such as cross-entropy between the output of
the RNN and the target output can be used.
Since the error function and all non-linear functions used
in the RNN are differentiable, training is done using stochas-
tic gradient descent. The result of training is a learned value
for all matrices in the RNN, which together form a part of
our model parameter M.
During inference, we are given a Ψ and a particular θ =
s1, . . . , sn, and would like to compute P (θ|Ψ; M). This is
straightforward: we set xt as the one-hot vector of st for
1 ≤ t ≤ n. Then, P (θ|Ψ; M) = ∏n−1t=1 yt(st+1) where yt is
computed using Equation 6.
4.4 Estimation of the Anomaly Score
There are two difficulties associated with computing the
anomaly score in our instantiation of the framework. The
first is that in general, the computation given in Equation 4
requires summing over a possibly infinite number of pro-
gram behaviors θ, which is not feasible. Second, it also re-
quires computing P (θ|XF ; M), which in turn requires inte-
grating out the unknown specification Ψ (Equation 2).
Both of these difficulties can be addressed via sampling.
We note that in general, to estimate a summation of the
form
∑
i∈I P1(i)P2(i) where P1(i) is a probability mass
function over the (possibly) infinite domain I and P2 is
a function on I , it suffices to take a number of samples
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i1, i2, . . . , im ∼ P1(i). One can then use:∑
i∈I
P1(i)P2(i) ≈
m∑
k=1
1
m
P2(ik)
as an unbiased estimate for the desired sum. It is well known
from standard sampling theory that the variance of this esti-
mator, denoted as σ2, reduces linearly as m increases.
We can apply this estimation process to estimate the
anomaly score for F by letting the domain I be the set of
all possible behaviors in Σ∗, and sampling a large number
of behaviors with probability proportional to PF (θ), then
letting P2(θ) = log(PF (θ)) − log(P (θ|XF ; M)) and using
the estimator described above. We can keep sampling until
the variance of the estimate is sufficiently small.
Fortunately, sampling a behavior from the distribution
PF (θ) is easy: we can use rejection sampling (Von Neu-
mann 1951) to sample an accepting run pi of F and then
simply obtain its behavior θ = [|pi|]. However we do not yet
have a complete solution to our problem. The difficulty is
that for a sampled behavior θ, it is not possible to compute
P2(θ) easily because of two reasons. First, the term PF (θ)
(Equation 5) requires summing over possibly infinite num-
ber of accepting runs ΠF , and second, there is the aforemen-
tioned problem that computing P (θ|XF ; M) requires inte-
grating over the unseen Ψ value.
To handle this, we extend our sampling-based algorithm.
Rather than just sampling a set of behaviors, we sample
the set I of (θ,Π′F , ψF ) triples, where Π
′
F is itself a set of
accepting runs of F sampled using the same method, and
ψF is a set of values for Ψ sampled from P (Ψ|XF ; M).
The latter set of samples can easily be obtained via Gibbs
sampling. One could then estimate the divergence as:
1
|I|
∑
(θ,Π′F ,ψF )∈I
log
 ∑
pi∈Π′F (θ)
1
|Π′F |
− log
 ∑
Ψ∈ψF
P (θ|Ψ; M)

where Π′F (θ) is the set of paths pi ∈ Π′F such that [|pi|] = θ.
The sum inside the first logarithm is estimating the fraction
of sampled accepting runs whose behavior is θ, thereby
estimating PF (θ) through sampling, and the sum inside of
the second logarithm is estimating P (θ|XF ; M).
The problem is that this estimate will be biased, since one
cannot commute the expectation operator with a logarithm.
That is:
E
log( ∑
pi∈Π′F (θ)
1
|Π′F |
)
 6= log(E
 ∑
pi∈Π′F (θ)
1
|Π′F |
)
whereE[Y ] for a random variable Y denotes the expectation
of Y . A similar problem exists for the second summation
used to estimate the logarithm of P (θ|XF ; M). Intuitively,
this bias is not surprising, since an over-estimate for the
probability PF (θ) by some constant amount is likely to have
Topic 1 Topic 2
A.setMessage(int)
A.setTitle(int)
new A(Context)
A.setPositiveButton(String,. . .)
A.setNegativeButton(String,. . .)
A.setMessage(String)
Topic 3 Topic 4
A.setView(View)
new A(Context)
A.setTitle(String)
A.setItems(String[],. . .)
A.setNeutralButton(int,. . .)
A.show()
Topic 5 Topic 6
C.getInstance(String)
C.init(int,Key,. . .)
C.doFinal(byte[])
B.connect()
B.getInputStream()
B.getOutputStream()
Figure 4. Top-3 methods from topics extracted by LDA
(A = AlertDialog.Builder, B = BluetoothSocket, C =
Cipher)
little effect on an estimate of the logarithm of the probability.
However, an under-estimate by the same amount can cause
a radical reduction in the estimate of the logarithm, and we
expect a negative bias.
A sampling-based estimate for this bias can be computed
using a Taylor series expansion about the expected value of
the biased estimator, which obtains an expression for the bias
in terms of the central moments of a Normal distribution;
estimating those moments leads to an estimate for the bias.
Assume that this estimator is encapsulated in a procedure
bias(θ,Π′F , ψF ) that computes the bias of an estimate. Our
final estimate for the anomaly score is:
1
|I|
∑
(θ,Π′F ,ψF )∈I
log
 ∑
pi∈Π′F (θ)
1
|Π′F |
− log
 ∑
Ψ∈ψF
P (θ|Ψ; M)

−bias(θ,Π′F , ψF )
5. Evaluation
In this section, we present results of experimental evaluation
of our method on the problem of learning specifications and
detecting anomalous usage of Android API in Android apps.
Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:
(1) Can we find useful de facto specifications followed by
Android developers (Section 5.2)?
(2) Using the specifications, can we find possible bugs in the
usage of the Android API in a corpus (Section 5.3)?
(3) How does specification learning help in anomaly detec-
tion (Section 5.4)?
(4) How does the Bayesian framework help in handling het-
erogeneity in the specifications (Section 5.5)?
5.1 Implementation and Experimental Setup
We first set up the practical environment for the experiments.
We implemented our method in a tool named Specification
Learning Tool, or SALENTO. SALENTO uses soot (Valle´e-
Rai et al. 1999) to implement symbolic execution and trans-
form code in an Android app into our automaton model for
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programs, TensorFlow (Abadi et al. 2015) to implement the
topic-conditioned RNN, and scipy (Jones et al. 2001–) to
implement LDA. SALENTO builds a coarse model of the
Android app life-cycle by collecting all entry points in the
application which are callback methods from the Android
kernel. SALENTO also uses soot’s Class Hierarchy Analy-
sis and Throw Analysis and obtains an over-approximation
of the set of possible call or exception targets, and soot’s
built-in constant propagator to detect infeasible paths.
In addition to API methods in Σ, SALENTO also collects
some semantic information about the state of the program
when an API call is made. This is done through the use of
simple Boolean predicates that capture, for example, con-
straints on the arguments of a call, or record whether an ex-
ception was thrown by the call. This allows us to learn spec-
ification on more complex programming constructs.
The training corpus consisted of 500 Android apps from (and
n.d.), and the testing corpus consisted of 250 apps from (fdr
n.d.). The two repositories did not overlap, perhaps since the
latter is open-source and the former is not. We conducted ex-
periments on three APIs used by Android apps: builders for
alert dialog boxes (android.app.AlertDialog.Builder),
bluetooth sockets (android.bluetooth.BluetoothSocket)
and cryptographic ciphers (javax.crypto.Cipher). From
the two repositories, we created about 6000 and 1800 au-
tomata models (henceforth just called programs) respec-
tively. While doing so, we set the accepting location of the
program as various locations of interest, that is, locations
where a method in one of these APIs was invoked. This
helps in localizing an anomaly to a particular location. All
experiments were run on a 24-core 2.2 GHz machine with
64 GB of memory and an Nvidia Quadro M2000 GPU.
Remark. The three APIs were chosen to represent com-
mon yet varied facets of a typical Android app (UI, func-
tionality, security). Evaluating on more APIs is not a funda-
mental limitation of our method or implementation. Rather
the limiting factor is, as we will see soon, the manual effort
that has to be spent in order to triage more anomalies and
report precision/recall.
5.2 Specification Learning
With a goal to discover specifications of Android API usage,
we applied LDA on the training corpus of programs, where
the alphabet Σ consisted of 25 methods from the three APIs.
We used α = 0.1 for each topic, and η = 1/|Σ| for all
words in a topic. Running LDA with 15 topics (K) took a
few seconds to complete. Figure 4 shows the top-3 words
(methods) from six topics extracted from the corpus that
we picked to exemplify. At a first glance, it may seem that
LDA is simply categorizing methods from different APIs
into separate topics, which can raise the question of why we
need topic models if we already knew the APIs beforehand.
LDA, however, does more than that. Topic 1 and Topic 2
contain methods from the same API but, interestingly, differ-
ent polymorphic versions with int and String arguments.
The model has discovered that the polymorphic versions fall
under separate topics, meaning that they are not often used
together in practice. Indeed, some Android apps declare all
resources they need in a separate XML file, and provide the
resource ID as the int argument. Other apps do not make
use of this feature and instead directly provide the string to
use in the dialog box. Therefore, it makes sense that an app
would seldom use both versions together. Similarly, Topic
3 also contains methods from the same API, however it de-
scribes yet another way to create dialog boxes. Note the lack
of the setMessage method in this topic, as the message
would already have been enveloped in the View passed to
setView (using both methods together can lead to the dis-
play of corrupted dialog boxes as shown in Figure 2(a)(ii)).
As these examples show, the topic model can expose
specifications of how methods in an API, or even different
APIs, are used together in practice.
5.3 Anomaly and Bug Detection
To evaluate our method on anomaly detection, we first
trained the topic-conditioned RNN on 60,000 behaviors
sampled from the training programs. Training took 20 min-
utes to complete. We then computed anomaly scores for the
1800 programs in our testing corpus. The time to compute
each score was around 2-3 seconds.
The histogram of scores, in Figure 5(a), shows a high con-
centration of small values, such as 5 or less, and a very low
concentration of high values. We chose to further investi-
gate programs appearing in the top 10% of anomaly scores
(above the red line) for possible bugs. Specifically, since
each program provides a localization to a location in the app
(through its accepting states), we investigated the behaviors
that were sampled from the program’s probabilistic behavior
model, that would have determined its anomaly score.
Our definition of a “possible bug” is based on the follow-
ing: is a behavior an instance of Android API usage that is
questionable enough that we would expect it to be raised as
an issue in a formal code review? Note that an issue raised in
a code review may relate to a design choice and not neces-
sarily cause the program to crash (an unusual button text, for
example). Nonetheless, such an issue would be raised and
likely fixed by engineers examining a code.
One problem with counting an anomaly as a possible
bug is that multiple anomalies in an app can have the same
“cause”—an incorrect statement or set of statements in the
code—and we would like to avoid “double-counting” differ-
ent anomalies with the same cause as different bugs. It is a
hard software engineering problem to establish the cause of
an anomaly/bug, which is out of scope of this paper. To avoid
this problem, however, we conservatively consider only the
top-most anomaly in each app in the top-10%, as clearly,
anomalies in two different apps cannot have the same cause.
Through a manual inspection and triage by one of the
authors, we found 10 different types of possible bugs in
9 2017/3/7
0 500 1000 1500
Program models
10
20
30
40
50
60
A
n
o
m
a
ly
 s
co
re
s
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 
Top-k% Anomalous Programs
Precision
Recall
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 
Top-k% Anomalous Programs
Precision
Recall
0x
2x
4x
6x
8x
10x
12x
14x
16x
18x
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 500 1000 1500
Av
g.
 R
el
at
ive
 In
cr
ea
se
An
om
al
y S
co
re
s
Programs
Original Mutated
(a) (b)(i) (b)(ii) (c)
Figure 5. (a) Histogram of anomaly score values, (b) Precision-recall for the possible bugs in Figure 6 for (i) Bayesian model
(ii) non-Bayesian model, and (c) Anomaly scores of remaining 90% programs before and after mutation
# Count Avg Anomaly
Score
1 2 43.7 C Single crypto object used to encryp-
t/decrypt multiple data
2 1 37.5 B Connecting to the same socket more
than once
3 1 24.7 B Attempt to close unopened socket
4 16 22.1 A Using String and int polymor-
phic methods together
5 6 21.8 C Crypto object created without spec-
ifying mode
6 6 21.6 A Using setMessage with setView
7 1 19.8 A Dialog displayed without message
8 1 19.3 B Failed socket connection left un-
closed
9 1 16.5 A Unusual button text
10 1 15.7 A Dialog displayed without buttons
Figure 6. Anomalies that are possible bugs, found in the top
10% of anomalous programs
our testing corpus (Figure 6), ranging from the benign to
the insidious. We have already seen instances of #6 and
#10 (Figure 2) that could display corrupted or unclosable
dialog boxes. #2 is serious as it could lead to an exception
being thrown due to a failed connection. #5 would create
a crypto object that defaults to the semantically insecure
ECB-encryption mode. #8 is serious, and could cause future
attempts to open a socket, even by other apps, to be blocked.
Figure 5(b)(i) shows the precision-recall plot for these
possible bugs in the top-10% of anomaly scores. It can be
seen that at around the top 8%, we reach full recall with
75% precision or 25% false positive rate. This is reasonable
compared to industrial static analysis tools such as Coverity
that advocates a 20% false positive rate for “stable” check-
ers (Bessey et al. 2010). Our method does not rely on spec-
ified properties to check, and many of these bugs cannot be
easily expressed as a formal property for traditional static
analyzers to check.
After this threshold, the precision continues to drop, and
we conjecture that it will not increase any further, because
almost all the possible bugs have already been found. To
substantiate this conjecture, we would have to manually in-
spect thousands of programs to qualitatively declare that all
anomalies have been triaged. Due to the practical infeasibil-
ity of this task, we instead quantitatively injected anomalies
into the remaining 90% of programs through mutations, and
measured whether our model is able to detect those muta-
tions. For each program, we mutated the API call before its
accepting states into one chosen randomly from Σ.
Figure 5(c) shows the anomaly scores before (dark) and
after (light) the mutation, and the cumulative mean of the
relative increase in the score (dashed line, secondary axis).
As a result of the mutation, the scores are greatly increased,
sometimes by 20 times or more, and the mean of the increase
is about 4x. That is, a mutation, on average, caused the
anomaly score to increase by 4 times, indicating that our
model detected the mutation.
Note that a random mutation, of course, has the possibil-
ity of reducing the anomaly score of a program if it had a
possible bug and the mutation happened to fix it. However,
since it is not very likely for a random mutation to fix a pos-
sible bug, these instances were few and far between.
5.4 Role of Learning in Anomaly Detection
To evaluate the role of learning, we compared with a tradi-
tional outlier detection method that does not require learn-
ing. k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) outlier detection (Altman
1992) uses a distance measure to compute the k nearest
neighbors of a given point within a dataset. The larger the
average distance to the k-NN, the more likely it is that the
point is an outlier, or anomaly. We already have a distance
measure between distributions: the KL-divergence between
the behavior model for the given program and a program in
the corpus.
We implemented such a k-NN and compared our method
with it by conservatively setting k = 1. That is, the anomaly
score of a given program is the smallest KL-divergence with
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Figure 7. Average relative increase in anomaly scores
of BluetoothSocket programs when the training corpus
only uses the APIs (a) BluetoothSocket, Cipher (b)
AlertDialog.Builder, BluetoothSocket, Cipher
any program in the corpus. However, even with this 1-NN
anomaly score, a substantial top 25% of programs had a
distance of infinity to the corpus, thus providing no useful
information about their anomalies.
The reason is that these programs simply happened to
generate a behavior that was not generated by any program
in the corpus. This sets P1(θ) to a non-zero value and P2(θ)
to zero in the KL-divergence formula (Equation 3) immedi-
ately making the sum infinity. This is unreasonable because
we clearly do not want to call every behavior we have not ob-
served in the training data an anomaly, but instead would like
to assign probabilities even to behaviors that were never seen
before. That is, we would like to generalize from the corpus.
This is why probabilistic specification learning is needed.
5.5 Comparison with non-Bayesian methods
To see how the Bayesian framework helps in handling het-
erogeneity in the corpus, we compared our method with a
non-Bayesian specification learning method. Existing state-
of-the-art methods use n-grams (Wang et al. 2016a) or
RNNs (Raychev et al. 2014) to learn a (non-Bayesian) sin-
gle probabilistic specification of program behaviors. We im-
plemented a non-Bayesian specification learner as an RNN
(not topic conditioned) and trained it directly on the behav-
iors in our training corpus. We then performed the same
anomaly and bug detection experiment in Section 5.3, query-
ing the trained model with behaviors in the testing program
for inference.
Figure 5(b)(ii) shows the precision-recall rate for the top-
10% of anomaly scores. Compared to our Bayesian method,
the non-Bayesian method performed poorly. Consider again
a “stable” checker’s false-positive rate of 20%, or 80% preci-
sion. At this threshold (marked by the red line), our Bayesian
method has about 80% recall compared to only 53% for the
non-Bayesian method. This shows that given a reasonable
precision threshold, our method is able to discover signifi-
cantly more bugs compared to the non-Bayesian method. It
is also worth noting that the non-Bayesian method was un-
able to discover any possible bug that was not found by our
method.
Effect of Heterogeneity. We finally performed a series of
experiments by incrementally increasing the heterogeneity
of the training programs. First, as a baseline, we considered
only programs that use the BluetoothSocket API, and
learned from them both Bayesian and non-Bayesian spec-
ifications of their behaviors. We then computed anomaly
scores of the 45 testing programs that use this API.
In the next step, we added to the training corpus programs
that also use the Cipher API, making the corpus more het-
erogeneous, and learned new specifications. We then com-
puted anomaly scores again, but using the new learned spec-
ifications. Figure 7(a) shows the average relative increase in
anomaly scores from using the old versus the new specifi-
cations. Ideally, one would expect the scores to not change,
because the addition of programs that use the Cipher API—
behaviors on which are unrelated to the BluetoothSocket
API— should not have any effect on the scores. This is
observed in the Bayesian specification (dashed line), that
lingers close to 1.0 on average. However, the non-Bayesian
specification (solid line) suffers from about a 2x increase.
This was further evident when programs that also use the
API AlertDialog.Builder were considered for training,
making the corpus even more heterogeneous (this is the same
training corpus in Section 5.3). In Figure 7(b), the relative
increase in scores using the Bayesian specification is, on av-
erage, close to 1.0, showing that it is robust to the increased
heterogeneity. However, the non-Bayesian specification in-
duces a further increase of about 3.5x in the scores.
We expect the gap to keep widening as more heteroge-
neous programs are added to the corpus, at some point mak-
ing the scores from the non-Bayesian model meaningless. In
contrast, the scores from our Bayesian model would remain
almost the same showing that the model is able to “focus” on
relevant parts of the learned specification, in principle toler-
ating arbitrary heterogeneity.
6. Related Work
Learning Qualitative Specifications. The thesis that com-
mon patterns of execution can serve as a proxy for specifi-
cations has been around since the early 2000s. Most efforts
in this area (Ammons et al. 2002, 2003; Zhong et al. 2009;
Li & Zhou 2005; Ernst et al. 1999; Nimmer & Ernst 2002;
Weimer & Necula 2005; Alur et al. 2005; Goues & Weimer
2009; Shoham et al. 2007; Whaley et al. 2002) focus on
qualitative specifications, typically finite automata. As men-
tioned earlier, such qualitative specifications are problematic
in the presence of noise in the training data.
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Learning Probabilistic Specifications. There is also a
body of work (Ammons et al. 2002; Beckman & Nori
2011; Kremenek et al. 2006; Livshits et al. 2009; Octeau
et al. 2016; Gvero et al. 2013; Raychev et al. 2014) that
uses machine learning techniques to learn probabilistic spec-
ifications from programs. Kremenek et al. (Kremenek et al.
2007, 2006) use factor graphs constructed using static anal-
ysis results to learn specifications on resource allocation
and release. ANEK (Beckman & Nori 2011) uses annota-
tions in APIs to infer specifications. MERLIN (Livshits et al.
2009) starts with a given initial specification and refines
it through factor graph construction and inference. Octeau
et al. (Octeau et al. 2016) use domain knowledge to train
probabilistic models of Android inter-component commu-
nication. JSNICE (Raychev et al. 2015) uses a probabilis-
tic graphical model to learn lexical and syntactical proper-
ties of programs such as variable names and types for the
purpose of de-obfuscating Javascript programs. Some re-
cent efforts (Nguyen et al. 2013; Nguyen & Nguyen 2015;
Wang et al. 2016a) have also used n-gram models to learn
specifications on source code structure. DEEPAPI (Gu et al.
2016) uses a neural encoder-decoder to learn correlations
between natural language annotations and API sequences.
HAGGIS (Allamanis & Sutton 2014) uses statistical tech-
niques to learn the structure of small code snippets (or “id-
ioms”) from a corpus. The work in this space that is perhaps
the closest to ours are two papers by Raychev et al. (Raychev
et al. 2014, 2016a). These approaches learn probabilistic
models of program behavior from large code corpora, using
recurrent neural networks among other models.
The key difference between the above approaches and
ours is that these methods learn a single probabilistic spec-
ification. In contrast, our approach learns a family of prob-
abilistic specifications simultaneously, and then specializes
this “big” model to particular analysis tasks using Bayes’
rule. As demonstrated in our experiments, this hierarchical
architecture is key to tolerating heterogeneity.
In very recent work, Raychev et al. (Raychev et al.
2016b), also argue that having a single, universal probabilis-
tic model for code can be inadequate, and propose a decision
tree algorithm that is used to choose among a bag of sta-
tistical models for tasks such as next-statement prediction.
While philosophically aligned with our work, their efforts
are quite different in that while we argue for conditioning
of models at the program level, they argue for conditioning
of models at the statement level and focus their efforts on
localized prediction tasks. One could imagine using a model
similar to what they have proposed within our framework as
a replacement for our RNN-based P (θ|Ψ).
Anomaly Detection. There is prior work on using learned
models of executions in anomaly detection (Wasylkowski
et al. 2007; Monperrus et al. 2010; Hangal & Lam 2002;
Chilimbi & Ganapathy 2006; Baah et al. 2006; Gao et al.
2007; Fu et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2016a). Aside from
differing in the nature of specifications used, methods in
these categories tend to assign anomaly scores to individual
behaviors (generated statically or dynamically). While our
method is able to assign such scores, it is also able to produce
aggregate anomaly scores for programs.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a Bayesian framework for learning prob-
abilistic specifications from large, heterogeneous code cor-
pora, and a method for finding likely software errors using
this framework. We have used an implementation of this
framework, based on a topic-model and a recurrent neural
network, to detect API misuse in Android, and shown that it
can find multiple subtle bugs.
A key appeal of our framework is that it does not impose
an a priori limit on the size or heterogeneity of the corpus.
In principle, our training corpus could contain all the world’s
code, and it is our vision to scale our method to settings close
to this ideal. Engineering instantiations of the framework
that work at such scale is a challenge for future work.
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A. Constructing Program Models through
Symbolic Execution
Here, we define the process that transforms a given pro-
gram into a program model (Section 3) that our framework
accepts as input. We consider a simple programming lan-
guage that represents a program as a Control Flow Graph
(CFG) G, where the vertices are the locations in the pro-
gram {l1, . . . , ln} and the edges are basic program opera-
tions from the following types: (i) assignments x:=y, (ii) as-
sume statements assume(c) that proceed with execution only
if the Boolean condition c is true, and (iii) method invoca-
tions m(a1, . . . , ak) that call the method m with arguments
a1, . . . , ak.
We construct the program model F through a symbolic
execution of the CFG G. Symbolic execution (King 1976;
Jaffar et al. 2012; Cadar et al. 2008) executes a program
with symbolic inputs, and keeps track of a symbolic state
that is analogous to a program’s memory. A symbolic state
is a tuple 〈l, v〉 where l is a program location and v is a
symbolic store that is a mapping of variables to symbolic
values. The symbolic states encountered during symbolic
execution are exactly the statesQ in the program model. The
set of accepting statesQA typically consists of all states 〈l, ·〉
at a particular location l in the program.
The evaluation of a symbolic expression e in a symbolic
store v, denoted as JeKv , is defined as usual: JxKv = v(x),JkKv = k, Je1 + e2Kv = Je1Kv + Je2Kv , Je1 − e2Kv =Je1Kv − Je2Kv and so on, where x and k are variables and
constants, respectively. The evaluation of a Boolean condi-
tion JcKv can also be defined in a similar manner. Note thatJcKv requires a theorem prover to evaluate, and the complete-
ness of this theorem prover affects the exclusion of infeasible
states from the program model.
Symbolic execution begins with an initial state q0 =
〈l0, ∅〉where l0 is the (special) initial location of the program
with an empty store. Then, recursively, given a state q =
〈l, v〉, symbolic execution proceeds as follows:
- If G has an edge from l to l′ where the operation is x:=y,
then q′ = 〈l′, v[x 7→ JyKv]〉 is added to Q and q ,1−−→ q′
is added to δ, where  is the empty symbol in Σ.
- If G has edges from l to l′1, . . . , l
′
m with operations
assume(c1), . . ., assume(cm) respectively, then each
condition is first evaluated for satisfiability: let C be the
set {l′j | JcjKv = true}. Then, for each l′j in C, a state
q′j = 〈l′j , v〉 is added to Q and l
,1/|C|−−−−→ l′j is added
to δ. By default, we give a uniform probability of 1/|C|
to all feasible branches, but this can be enhanced if the
distribution of inputs to the program is known, or through
external techniques such as model counting.
- IfG has an edge from l to l′ with the operationm(a1, . . . , ak),
then a state q′ = 〈l′, v〉 is added to Q, and a transition
q
m,1−−→ q′ is added to δ if m is in the alphabet Σ, other-
wise, q
,1−−→ q′ is added to δ.
B. Counteracting Bias in Anomaly Scores
As mentioned before, the estimator used to compute anomaly
scores is biased because the logarithm and expectation op-
erators do not commute. However, we can develop an al-
gorithm to counter-act the bias in estimating the bias of a
sampling-based estimator for a logarithm using a Taylor se-
ries expansion. Assume that we have an estimator of the
form X =
∑
s∈S f(s) for some sample set S and function
f(s); there are two such estimators in the computation of the
anomaly score algorithm of Section 4.4. Also let pˆ denote
E[X]. Expanding the Taylor series for log(X) around the
point pˆ we have log(X) =
log(pˆ)+
(X − pˆ)
pˆ
− (X − pˆ)
2
2pˆ2
+
(X − pˆ)3
3pˆ3
− (X − pˆ)
4
4pˆ4
+...
So, E[log(X)] =
log(pˆ) +
E[(X − pˆ)]
pˆ
− E[(X − pˆ)
2]
2pˆ2
+
E[(X − pˆ)3]
3pˆ3
− ...
Then the bias is E[log(X)]− log(E[X]), or
E[(X − pˆ)]
pˆ
− E[(X − pˆ)
2]
2pˆ2
+
E[(X − pˆ)3]
3pˆ3
− ...
The numerator in the ith term in this series corresponds to
the ith central moment of X . Since X is computed as an av-
erage of a number of independent, identically distributed
samples, according to the Central Limit Theorem, X is
asymptotically normally distributed. Given this, and using
the central moments of the normal distribution, we can write
the bias as:
−σ
2(X)
2pˆ2
− 3σ
4(X)
4pˆ4
− 15σ
6(X)
6pˆ6
− 105σ
8(X)
8pˆ8
− ...
In practice, an estimate that takes into account the first three
or four terms should be adequate. When estimating those
terms, pˆ can be estimated using the observed value of X;
that is, pˆ ≈∑s∈S f(s). σ2(X) is the variance of X and can
be estimated in many ways; we advocate using a bootstrap
resampling procedure (Efron & Tibshirani 1994). That is,
we uniformly resample (with replacement) a set S′ of |S|
items from S, and use this to produce a simulated value∑
s∈S′ f(s) for pˆ. We perform this resampling procedure
many times, and use the observed variance as an estimate
for σ2(X). In this way, it is possible to obtain an estimate
for bias(θ,Π′F , ψF ). Plugging this into the equation at the
end of Section 4.4 then gives us our final estimator.
One last issue to consider is how to to compute the vari-
ance of this estimator so that we can know the error of our
estimate and stop sampling at the appropriate time. We also
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advocate a bootstrap resampling procedure for this task. We
simply re-samplem (θ,Π′F , ψF ) triples from the set of sam-
pled (θ,Π′F , ψF ) triples. We then compute Section 4.4’s es-
timator for each such triple. Taking the average value over all
of the triples produces a simulated estimate for the anomaly
score. Repeating this process many times and computing the
empirically observed variance produces an estimate for the
variance of the anomaly score.
C. Gibbs Sampling to Approximate
P (Ψ|X; M)
LDA models a document as a distribution over topics, and
a topic as a distribution over words in the vocabulary. An
LDA model is thus fully characterized by the following vari-
ables: (i) α and η, hyper-parameters of a Dirichlet prior
that chooses the topic distribution of each document and the
word distribution of each topic, respectively (ii) ΨFi , the
topic distribution of document XFi , (iii) βk, the word dis-
tribution of topic tk, (iv) zi,j , the topic that generated word
j in document i, and (v) wi,j , the jth word in document i.
With these parameters, the generative process of documents,
according to LDA, is as follows:
1. Decide on a topic distribution for document XFi : ΨFi ∼
DirK(α), where α is a K-length vector of reals. This
sampling would produce a distribution over K topics.
2. Decide on a word distribution for topic tk: βk ∼ Dir|Σ|(η).
3. For each word position i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤M and 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni,
(a) Decide on a topic for the word to be generated at i, j:
zi,j ∼ CategoricalK(ΨFi).
(b) Generate the word: wi,j ∼ Categorical|Σ|(βzi,j ).
The total probability of all variables in the model is then
K∏
k=1
P (βk|η)
M∏
i=1
P (ΨFi |α)
N∏
j=1
P (zi,j |ΨFi)P (wi,j |βzi,j )
We refer the reader to (Blei et al. 2003) for details
on training an LDA model. The result of training is a
learned value for all latent variables in the model, partic-
ularly all the βk. During inference, we are given a particular
XF and would like to compute the posterior distribution
P (Ψ|XF ; M).
In LDA terms, Ψ would be a topic distribution for XF
(we drop the i subscript since we are now only working
with one document). In order to estimate this distribution,
we employ a standard Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method called Gibbs sampling. First, we sample Ψ from
a Dirichlet prior parameterized by some randomly chosen
d: Ψ ∼ DirK(d). Then, each step of Gibbs sampling re-
computes Ψ using Bayes’ rule:
1. For every word wj in XF , decide on a topic tk that could
have generated wj by sampling from the distribution
P (tk|wj) = P (wj |tk)P (tk)
P (wj)
where P (wj |tk) is the probability of the wordwj accord-
ing the learned model βk, P (tk) is obtained from the cur-
rent value of Ψ and P (wj) =
∑K
k=1 P (wj |tk)P (tk) is a
normalization term.
2. Compute the vector n = (n1, . . . , nK) where nk is the
number of words in XF that were generated by topic tk.
3. Re-sample Ψ from the distribution Ψ ∼ DirK(d+ n).
Gibbs sampling guarantees that by repeating these steps
for some number of iterations (that depends on the value of
d), the samples of Ψ would eventually converge to coming
from the posterior distribution P (Ψ|XF ; M), thus approxi-
mating this distribution through sampling.
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